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Introduction
Participatory forest management (PFM) has been 
widely implemented in the developing world in 
pursuit of three overall policy objectives: forest 
conservation; improved local livelihoods; and 
promotion of good governance. However, there 
is limited evidence on the impact of PFM and 
studies that document the effect through tem-
poral comparison with a non-treated control site 
are particularly scarce. This policy brief reports 
on the effects of one form of PFM, Joint Forest 
Management (JFM), as implemented in forests 
of the Eastern Afromontane biodiversity hotspot 
in Tanzania. The study includes a temporal 
comparison between a JFM and a control for-
est spanning seven years (2001-2008) and uses 
bushmeat hunting as an indicator of both con-
servation outcome and to evaluate livelihoods 
implications. 
Study area
The evaluation focuses on New Dabaga Ulon-
gambi Forest Reserve where bushmeat hunting 
is the main conservation concern. The forest is 
37 km2 (montane to upper montane forest) and 
surrounded by six communities. JFM agreements 
were officially enacted in February 2002. The 
agreement provides access to a few non-timber 
and low-value forest products with only very 
limited benefits to the villagers, which is typical 
of JFM in Tanzania. Management is vested in 
elected Village Natural Resource Councils  
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Increase VNRC income through PES or REDD schemes in order to finance patrolling and de-
livery of tangible community benefits linked to forest and wildlife protection.
Ensure fair and democratic election mechanisms and active involvement of vulnerable 
groups in rule-making.
Make all transactions subject to public auditing such that VNRCs and VCs are made account-
able to each other as well as to their common constituency.
Transparency of VNRC transactions could be promoted by making top-down fund transfers 
(c.f. above) contingent on quarterly VNRC presentations of accounts at general village as-
semblies and by involving the village general assembly in decisions on use of VNRC funds.
Policy Conclusions
(VNRCs) that are answerable to the elected village councils. 
Each VNRC has four patrol guards and the power to arrest 
and fine offenders and collect fees for permitted forest uses. 
Communities are not allowed to use or collect revenue from 
wildlife but are required to protect their forest against hunt-
ing. The VNRCs deposit revenue in a joint bank account from 
where a zonal committee annually distributes funds for man-
agement expenditures including salaries. Surplus funds must 
be used for local development.
Methods
Changes in number of active hunters, densities of traps and 
relative wildlife densities in the forest were used as proxies for 
conservation outcomes and were assessed one year before 
and six years after implementation of JFM through interviews 
and transect surveys (18 km on five transects) (see Fig. 1). To 
calibrate for trends not associated with JFM, the changes in 
trap densities were adjusted for changes in a control site – 
the nearby Uzungwa Scarp Forest Reserve – where JFM has 
not been implemented. The extent to which new income 
sources introduced by JFM compensates hunters for lost in-
come from hunting (i.e. in terms of the replacement value) 
was assessed as a proxy for livelihoods impacts. To this end 
weekly interviews were conducted with 97 active hunters in 
2001 and again with 75 of these individuals in 2008, record-
ing catch and price obtained from bushmeat over six months. 
Additionally, income from JFM related sources and costs in 
terms of fees paid for permits and fines were recorded in 
2008. Finally, the aspirations to good governance was evalu-
ated through an audit of VNRC accounts supported by in-
terviews with households about their knowledge on, experi-
ences with, opinions about and actual practices in relation to 
JFM associated rules on hunting, VNRC handling of common 
funds and ways of making leaders downwardly accountable.  
Conservation Outcomes
Transect surveys revealed a considerable although spatially 
skewed conservation improvement. Both blue and Harvey’s 
duiker (i.e. forest anthelope species) (Fig. 2 and 3) increased 
significantly in the southern part of the JFM forest (transects 
4 and 5) where a population of the IUCN red-listed Abbott’s 
duiker had also become established in 2008. The density 
of traps had declined significantly and traps were almost 
absent in the southern part in 2008 (Fig. 4). Meanwhile, the 
density of traps had increased by 15-19% in the non-JFM 
forest. Accordingly, the corrected effect of JFM is a 97-101% 
reduction in the density of traps. The number of individuals 
Figure 1. Map of study area and its location in Tanzania. 
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actively hunting in the JFM forest also declined from 180 in 
2001, to 29 in 2008 (Table 1). Assuming that domestic meat 
supply and demand remained stable, the average effect of 
JFM is thus a 79% reduction in the number of active hunters 
between villages. In combination with negative correlations 
between relative wildlife densities and densities of traps on 
individual transects and comparison with the non-JFM forest 
that remained heavily hunted, this strongly suggest that the 
increase in wildlife density in the JFM forest is indeed a result 
of reduced hunting and an effect of JFM. 
Livelihoods Impacts 
JFM income sources included salaries from VNRC activities 
and net cash or subsistence benefits from bee keeping and 
fish farming introduced under JFM. “Retired” hunters’ income 
from these activities in 2008 was significantly lower than their 
income from bushmeat hunting in 2001. This indicates that 
JFM did not compensate those who stopped hunting for lost 
income. However, for hunters who remained active, there was 
no significant difference between the profit from hunting in 
2001 and 2008 although they put in less effort. This was due 
to significant increase in catch per unit effort (biomass caught 
per trap night) and higher bushmeat price, while the risk of 
getting caught and fined appeared to remain low. In 2008, 
hunters that continued therefore obtained significantly higher 
total benefits from the forest (JFM profit plus value of bush-
meat minus fines) than hunters who had stopped.
Promotion of good governance
The audit showed that only 45% of VNRC income was ac-
counted for in receipts, vouchers, cash or bank account bal-
ance, implying that more than half of the officially registered 
income had disappeared. In the period 2004-2008 VNRCs 
claimed to have handed over on average US$ 150 per year 
for local development projects to the village chairmen. Yet, 
only 9–21% of this amount could be confirmed through 
vouchers and several of the projects could not be physically 
identified. Hunters indicated that they perceived to obtain 
few or no tangible benefits from JFM and that they suspected 
embezzlement of JFM income because the VNRCs provided 
poor or no information about their financial transactions. 
While only 5% of non-hunters severely distrusted the VNRCs’ 
financial management, 72% and 94% of “retired” and ac-
tive hunters respectively did so and the active hunters stated 
that this distrust and suspicion was an important reason why 
they continued hunting illegally. The active hunters were fur-
thermore concentrated in particular villages where confirmed 
Fig. 2. Density of blue duiker dung piles per km2 on transect 
1-5 in the JFM forest.
Fig. 3. Density of Harvey’s duiker dung piles per km2 on tran-
sect 1-5 in the JFM forest.
Fig. 4. Densities of total traps (old and active) per km2 on 
transect 1-5 in the JFM forest.
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  Isele Lulanzi Lusinga Illamba Kidabaga Magome
2001 Active hunters 24 24 21 31 48 32
2008 Active hunters 2 3 8 6 1 9
 Dead 1 3 6 1 4 4
 Moved away 2 2 3 7 9 4
Table 1. Number of people hunting in 2001, continuing in 2008 or having stopped for “natural” reasons (i.e. death and moving 
away).
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cases of embezzlement by village council or VNRC members 
had occurred or were developing. This in turn explains the 
variation in wildlife recovery between the northern and 
southern end of the JFM forest (c.f. above). 
In terms of electoral accountability, community members 
claimed that initial elections for VNRC membership were 
based on screened applications and pre-selection by the vil-
lage councils and district forest officers. In most cases this 
had left village general assemblies with no actual choice be-
tween candidates. Furthermore, elections were not conduct-
ed through secret balloting and had often been postponed 
or even entirely skipped. On a couple of occasions district 
forest officers had intervened in elections to ensure that par-
ticular individuals maintained their VNRC membership with 
the alleged reason of limiting district costs for training newly 
elected VNRC members. VNRC members and village chair-
men also actively evaded downward accountability between 
elections by not following agreed procedures on presentation 
of VNRC accounts and performance. However, there was also 
evidence of emerging downward accountability being estab-
lished. On one occasion, individuals had organized in local 
agitation groups and succeeded in toppling an entire VNRC 
at the election due to their poor performance. In two other 
instances, groups formed to contact political party members 
and district authorities requesting their intervention upon sus-
pected embezzlement. 
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Conclusions
This study shows that JFM can effectively reduce illegal hunt-
ing and facilitate recovery of wildlife populations – although 
in this case it appears driven by enforcement of hunting bans 
rather than economic incentives and rights per se. Neverthe-
less, JFM can accomplish conservation objectives in sensitive 
areas where nature protection cannot realistically be pursued 
by establishing new national parks. New opportunities in JFM 
did not compensate hunters for lost income and ironically, 
hunters who remained active obtained significantly higher 
benefits than those who had stopped. Several aspects of JFM 
implementation and practises of VNRCs deviated consider-
ably from good governance and relations between VNRCs/
village councils and their constituencies were characterized by 
distinct differences between rules-on-paper and rules-in-use. 
Interference by the district forest office and village councils in 
electing VNRC members also compromised the establishment 
of accountability relations through frequent, fair and demo-
cratic elections. Accordingly, the rule of “law” (rules-on-pa-
per) to ensure downwards accountability of local leaders was 
replaced by rules-in-use serving the exact opposite objective 
and elite capture has been a distinct governance outcome 
of JFM in several villages. In short, attempted new ‘law’ was 
largely defeated by pre-existing social order. In combination, 
the results suggest that to ensure that JFM provides efficient, 
effective and equitable nature conservation, higher levels of 
government must support rather than undermine the estab-
lishment of democratic, representative and accountable local 
authorities and local authorities must be financially rewarded 
for conserving habitats and species. 
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